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Abstract
How will the UK exit from the EU affect gender-based violence against women? Four issues are addressed
to answer this question. First, the importance of  theorising the interconnections with a gender regime,
including between gendered economic inequality and gendered violence. Second, the significance of  the
difference between hard and soft security strategies for the level of  gendered violence. Third, the significance
of  the emerging competence of  the EU in the governance of  violence/security relative to the member states
and international bodies. Fourth, the specific nature of  Brexit and the form of  the future relationship
between the UK and EU. The paper concludes that Brexit is likely to increase gender-based violence against
women in the UK, partly as a result of  the differences in the regulation of  violence/security between the UK
and the EU and partly as a result of  increases in gender inequality in the economy that has effects across
the whole gender regime.
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Introduction
The current strategies to restructure the EU have implications for the governance ofviolence. Is one site of  legal intervention into the governance of  violence more
important than another? Brexit provides an opportunity to think through these questions
as to which polity, which state, which site of  governance matters most and in which way for
legal interventions that contribute to ending gender-based violence. 
Brexit is gendered since the UK and the EU are differently gendered on many issues.1
Much of  the debate on the gender of  the EU has focused on changes in gender policy and
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on the economy.2 There is an emerging literature on gender in relation to EU governance of
violence and security.3 The European Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice is potentially as
significant an aspect of  the gender of  Brexit as the Single European Market because of  its
significance for gender-based violence. It is thus of  concern for the analysis of  feminism and
the EU.4 The gender of  Brexit raises issues of  the relative significance of  member states and
the EU-level in governance, which are relevant to wider debates on the EU and on the
gender of  the EU.5 It raises still wider questions as to the extent to which individual states
can be autonomous in a global era in which there are competing hegemons, and how this
analysis of  the gender of  scale should proceed.6
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Thinking through alternative scenarios for Brexit offers an opportunity to consider
the way in which different states and polities have implications for the governance of
gendered violence. Four scenarios are identified. 
• First, no change because only the UK state governs crime and security – so
exit from the EU would make no difference. 
• Second, little change because the UK continues to take EU rules even while
ceasing to make EU rules. 
• Third, little change because the main actors will continue their influence:
either because of  the continuing cooperation of  entities other than national
states through principles and networks of  mutual exchange; or because of
the significance of  international legal instruments that set the standards for
both the UK and the EU. 
• Fourth, major change because the UK would lose the EU anchor for
(gender) equality policy and for a ‘soft’ crime/security strategy rooted in the
Treaties, the Single European Market and the European Area of  Freedom,
Security and Justice. 
Four conceptual and theoretical issues that underpin the differences between the
scenarios are also identified. 
• The conceptualisation of  the links between different aspects of  gender
relations and varieties of  gender regimes: can one gendered institution be
examined in isolation from the others or does it always require analysis of  the
other gendered institutions that make up its environment and constitute a
regime? 
• The conceptualisation of  and variation in violence/security. 
• The significance of  the UK, EU and other polities in the governance of
gendered violence/security. 
• The nature of  Brexit, which requires identification of  relevant aspects of  the
EU. 
This discussion matters for the prioritisation of  political objects, which policies and
polities matter most, in strategy to end violence against women. 
Gender, violence and state policy
An initial issue is how to compare the UK with the EU and other relevant polities. This
is not only to compare the gender projects and programmes of  the UK and EU,7
although this is crucial, but also of  other hegemons and international agencies that may
shape the UK in the absence of  an anchor to the EU.8 There are two dimensions of
gender equality projects to compare: strategy and instruments. Variations in strategy refer
to the preferred model of  gender relations and how to get there:9 this requires a
conceptualisation of  alternative gender futures (discussed below under varieties of
gender regimes). Variations in instruments refers to the mechanisms and institutions that
are mobilised to take forward the gender equality project; these include laws, courts,
governmental departments and agencies, and civil society institutions. 
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What are the EU-level strategies and instruments for gender equality that the UK
might lose on Brexit? The EU-level has innovated on some aspects of  gender equality,10
although there are dilemmas and contradictions11 and suggestions that it is diminishing.12
EU equality policy derives its legal competence from Treaties, articulated in Directives
and Regulations, with implementation supported by technical agencies and the European
Court of  Justice, while priorities are set by the European Commission, European
Parliament and the European Council. It has long had a distinctive strategy for gender
equality,13 more recently a plan for strategic engagement.14 Gender equality is embedded,
though not always explicit, in the EU strategies for economic growth (articulated in the
Single European Market) and security (articulated in the European Area for Freedom,
Security and Justice). 
A comparison of  the UK and EU on gender equality policy finds the EU often in
advance over the UK. The UK government White Paper addressing Brexit15 positions
gender equality as if  it were sufficiently embedded in UK-level institutions and as an issue
to be addressed separately from the economy and security. The structure of  the European
Union (Withdrawal) Bill (HC)16 implied that gender equality was fully embedded in UK
law. However, Guerrina and Masselot17 are sceptical of  this claim, because of  the
government refusal of  an amendment, during the November 2017 House of  Commons
debate, that would have safeguarded rights to equality established under the 2010 Equality
Act and because of  the actions of  the UK government in opposing developments in
gender equality policy in the EU, such as the Pregnant Workers Directive and for gender
balance on corporate boards. Further consideration is needed of  the comparison of  UK
and EU policy on gendered violence/security.18
POLICIES TO END VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Should the analysis be restricted to policies that name gendered violence/security (e.g.
violence against women, gender-based violence) as their object, or does it include all
policies that indirectly have this consequence? 
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On the one hand, the analysis might only concern policies that name violence against
women as the issue; while on the other hand, the analysis might extend to policies that
address other (gendered) issues that have indirect but significant effects on gendered
violence/security. If  there is no Brexit change in policies that name ‘violence against
women’, it might appear as if  Brexit could make no difference – if  the analysis is
restricted to this field. If  there is no change in gendered violence/security policies but
change in policies that have consequences for gendered violence/security, then it is
important that the focus is extended to include these indirect links if  a full picture of  the
implications of  Brexit is to be established. The underlying issue is whether analysis treats
institutions as if  they were autonomous or should extend to the system of  interconnected
institutions that make up a gender regime. 
Underpinning these questions is whether variations in gender violence are theorised
at the meso (institutional) or macro (regime/societal) levels. Feminist institutionalist
analysis in political science has argued for a focus on institutions, not only the micro
level.19 However, the connections between gendered political institutions have also been
demonstrated, for example in the impact of  feminist movements on the state20 and in the
impact of  descriptive and substantive political representation of  gender on the
constitution of  gender relations.21 Further, there is a link between gendered economic
inequality and gendered violence.22 Gendered institutions should not be treated as if  they
were autonomous, but rather analysed as part of  an interconnected system of  gender
relations or gender regime.23 Developing gender concepts at the macro level also
facilitates engagement with other macro level debates on European change.24 The
analysis of  the consequences of  Brexit should include gender regimes as well as gendered
institutions in order to consider the indirect effects of  changes in institutions other than
gendered violence/security on gendered violence/security. 
VARIETIES OF GENDER REGIMES
Comparing gender regimes requires a conceptualisation of  varieties of  gender relations,
so that pre-Brexit and post-Brexit forms of  gender relations can be compared. 
The comparison of  macro level gender relations has been addressed in several ways.
This has included the extent to which there is a male breadwinner or dual earner
household and its relationship to the welfare state,25 but this does not include
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violence/security. The analysis of  gender orders by Connell26 is wider, but it does not
include violence/security as a distinctive institutional domain. Walby’s typology of  gender
regimes,27 includes violence as well as economy, polity and civil society, and is drawn on
here in order to conceptualise the potential changes in gender relations consequent on
Brexit. 
Walby differentiates between domestic and public gender regimes, and then further
differentiates public gender regimes along a spectrum from neoliberal to social
democratic. These differences in varieties of  gender relations are mobilised at the meso
level of  specific institutional clusters (economy, polity, violence and civil society) and at
the macro level of  the gender regime as a whole (for example, UK, EU), while also being
relevant to the micro level of  practices and projects (such as a strategy for gender
equality). In the domestic gender regime, there is appropriation of  women’s labour within
the household, and the exclusion of  women from paid employment and other public
domains of  the polity, education, and some aspects of  civil society. In the public gender
regime, while appropriation of  women’s labour in the household does not cease, it is less
significant since women are not excluded from the public domains of  employment, polity,
education and civil society. Different trajectories from a domestic to public gender regime
has consequences for its form, sometimes a more social democratic and other times a
more neoliberal form of  the public gender regime. The social democratic variety has
greater gender depth of  democracy and less inequality than the neoliberal form. The
more unequal forms of  the gender regime generate higher levels of  violence against
women.28
There has been a slow change from domestic towards a public gender regime in
Europe; but this is still not complete, so the two varieties co-exist. There is a spectrum
from more neoliberal public gender regimes (e.g. UK) to more social democratic public
gender regimes (e.g. Sweden). The EU has a more social democratic public gender regime
than the average of  EU member states.29 In the crisis starting from 2008, there have been
varied changes in the gender regime in Europe: in the UK, within the public gender
regime, a turn away from social democratic towards neoliberal;30 while in Spain both a
partial push-back from public to domestic and also from social democratic towards
neoliberal public form.31
Will the UK develop a more neoliberal public gender regime after Brexit? The
typology of  varieties of  gender regime that distinguishes not only between domestic and
public forms, but also between social democratic and neoliberal public forms, is helpful
in conceptualising changes.
1 Violence against women
The concept of  gendered violence/security sits at the point of  overlap of  three fields –
gender, violence, and security. This paper is not the place for a discussion of  the nuances
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in the relationship between the concepts, which has been developed elsewhere.32 The
focus here is on ‘gender-based violence’ and ‘violence against women’ as short-hand for
a variety of  practices.
There are differences in strategies towards gendered violence by the UK, EU and
other relevant entities. A key distinction in strategy towards violence is between ‘hard’ and
‘soft’. ‘Hard’ entails the use of  violence and coercion to deter the use of  violence by
others. ‘Soft’ entails the use of  policy instruments other than violence and coercion to
generate the forms of  society that generate less violence.33 ‘Hard’ seeks to improve
security and reduce violence in society by increasing security and criminal justice activities
of  the state/polity. There is a tendency to grow the state and its agencies concerned with
criminal justice and security.34 ‘Soft’ seeks to reduce violence and improve security by
reducing inequalities between perpetrators and victims, including targeted support for
victims. Less coercive practices can be adopted by states: diplomacy in the
neighbourhood;35 a variety of  ‘peace’ processes;36 supporting victims and those in
vulnerable situations through both targeted services and by generic developments in
welfare state provisioning; the use of  civil legal rather than criminal legal interventions;
and regulations to reduce exploitation and inequalities in the economy and elsewhere.
These strategies implicitly mobilise different theories of  the relationship between
violence and society.37 While many entities deploy some aspects of  both approaches, the
balance between them and resources allocated to them varies significantly, with varied
outcomes for the level of  violence in a society (for example, homicide rates in the US are
five times higher than those in Europe).38 ‘Hard’ is associated with neoliberalism, ‘soft’
with social democracy.39 The EU has a softer security strategy than the US;40 the UK is
in between.41
Violence varies with inequality, so policies addressing inequality are relevant to
violence. The extent of  violence in a country varies not only with the nature of  the
strategy and capacity of  its national state, but also with the extent of  inequality and
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poverty.42 Domestic violence against women increases in gendered economic crisis.43
Hence, changes in policy towards (gendered) economic inequality has implications for
(gendered) violence/security. Further, gendered violence varies with gendered political
representation, for example, the rate of  femicide is higher in countries with lower rates
of  women in parliament.44 Variations in many aspects of  the gender regime are relevant
for the structuring of  violence/security.
The analysis of  potential changes in gender-based violence against women, or more
generally gendered violence/security, consequent on Brexit needs to include not only
policies directly focused on violence against women but also policies towards (gender)
equality (including in the economic and political domains).
2 Polities and governance 
What are the differences in the governance of  gendered violence of  the various polities?
The analysis of  the governance of  gendered violence relevant can be divided into two
aspects: the strategies; and the entities. The strategies for violence vary in focus between
‘hard’, using force to deter others; and ‘soft’, using non-coercive means to secure peace,
which were discussed above. The discussion of  relevant entities and their capacities
includes not only the UK and the EU, but potentially also the UN and the USA, which
make up the world system in which these changes are taking place. There are four
approaches to the relevant polities: states only; member states and EU only; multiple
polities in a world system, in addition to member states and EU; and governance by 
non-polities.
2.1 STATES ONLY
If  only national states (including devolved administrations) were involved in the
governance of  violence and security, then UK exit from the EU would have no
consequences for gendered violence/security. This is consistent with the traditional
‘Westphalian’ approach to states, which assumes that they are the only significant entities
involved in governance and that the sovereignty of  individual states is paramount, even
if  compromised a little in practice. In this approach, violence/security is regarded as a
matter for states alone. Both ‘law and order’ and ‘warfare’ were considered the prerogative
of  the sovereign state. However, this is not the case in practice. 
2.2 STATES PLUS EU
If  the EU is significant for the governance of  violence/security, then Brexit would make
a difference to violence in the UK. Is the EU different and, if  so, is it better than the UK
in reducing violence? Is such a zero-sum approach to the powers of  the member state and
EU-level45 appropriate or, since the EU assists member states to complete their domestic
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agendas, is it better to conceptualise this as a situation in which pooling some sovereignty
aids all?46
The EU has a softer violence/security strategy than the UK. The EU has developing
competence in internal and external violence/security, especially since the 2006 Treaty of
Lisbon.47 It is addressed by EU law (Treaties, Directives, Regulations, European Court of
Justice), by EU political institutions (Parliament, Council, Commission), by Commission
Directorate-Generals, and by more than 10 technical agencies (from Europol to
Eurostat). The 2006 Treaty of  Lisbon significantly expanded the legal competence at the
EU-level to act to pursue the EU’s goals, leading to new Directives and new agencies. In
Article 82 of  the Treaty, EU-level competence to address violent crime is enabled (though
limited to cross-border and serious crime) and underpins several Directives that engage
with gender-based violence against women.48 The EU technical agencies are important in
the practical integration of  the EU into a single Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice.
They include: Europol (police); Eurojust (judges); Frontex (borders); CEPOL (police
college); EASO (asylum); FRA (fundamental rights); and EIGE (gender equality). Under
the direction of  the European Commission, and the guidance and jurisdiction of  the
European Court of  Justice, each agency assists the practical cooperation of  professionals
across all the member states of  the EU, for example, setting standards and exchanging
sensitive information. 
The EU has a stronger approach to gender equality than the UK, which has
consequences for gendered violence/security. Policy instruments to implement the goal
of  gender equality are varied and are lodged in institutions that have different amounts
of  power and influence. These instruments include: legal principles (for example, equal
treatment); descriptive representation (for example, gender balance in decision-making
institutions); and gender mainstreaming (the inclusion of  gender equality goals in all
policy-making instruments and institutions). The UK government, in its White Paper on
Brexit, addresses gender (and other) equalities issues as if  they were a separate policy field
from those of  the economy or violence/security. However, there are significant variations
in the extent to which the project, or goal, of  gender equality is embedded in different
policy fields. The variations have significant effects. For example, the legal principle of
‘equal treatment’, written into the Treaties that underpin the EU, is differently and more
strongly institutionalised in the EU institutions that regulate the Single European Market
than in the Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice; by contrast, the policy of  ‘gender
mainstreaming’ potentially has implications for a wider range of  policies but tends to be
weakly institutionalised.
The EU has significant powers to promote the reduction of  gendered violence, both
directly through its policies on violence/security and indirectly through its policies on
gender equality. Changes in EU-level competence that diminish UK autonomy have
implications for the extent to which Brexit would make a difference to the governance of
gendered violence/security. 
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2.3 POLITIES IN ADDITION TO STATES AND THE EU
If  there are relevant polities in addition to states and the EU, then the implications of
Brexit will depend on the significance, capacities and strategies of  these entities in
addition. 
An exclusive focus on states is challenged by the recognition of  a plurality of  polities
and sources of  governance, such as organised religions, cities, the UN, Council of
Europe, and NATO, which overlap rather than saturating a given territory.49 It is further
challenged when these entities are understood to operate in a wider, global environment.
These other polities differ in the extent to which their gendered violence/security
strategies are aligned with the EU’s relatively soft strategy, such as the UN and its concern
for human rights, or aligned with a harder more coercive strategy, such as that of  the
USA. The former includes the UN (UN Declaration of  Human Rights, UN Office of
Drugs and Crime, UN Security Council, UN Women) and the Council of  Europe
(European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of  Human Rights, Istanbul
Convention). The latter includes major states seeking hegemony over global rules and
practices, especially the USA.50
There are parallel institutional structures in the UK and EU and additionally in the
Council of  Europe, UN and NATO, including law, politically led policy-making
institutions, technical agencies to implement policy, shaped by wider and varied systems
of  inequality. Identifying what forms of  governance are being left behind on exit from
the EU is entangled with identifying whether these were ‘really EU’ or were a
consequence of  simultaneous engagement of  the UK and EU with the Council of
Europe (for example, the European Convention on Human Rights) or the UN (for
example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, or UN Security Council
Resolutions) or the USA. 
2.4 OTHER ENTITIES
One approach to the governance of  gendered violence/security focuses on polities, while
a second addresses wider forces, including economy (e.g. global capital) and civil society
(e.g. feminist projects). 
Within the UK, interpersonal violent crime is directly addressed by law, government
ministries of  home affairs and justice, the criminal justice system, and the provision of
services to victims, and indirectly shaped by the system of  inequality. Interstate
violence/security is directly addressed by law, government ministries of  foreign affairs
and defence, the military and security services, and indirectly shaped by the global system
of  inequality. In the second approach, the governance of  objects other than violence
affects violence. Hence, variations in violence may be caused by many institutions in
society not only by states. For example, changes in gendered economic inequality may
change the rate of  gender-based violence. The approach selected depends on the theory
of  violence in society. 
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These issues are entangled with more theoretical questions as to the nature of  polities
and of  governance involved in the relationship between the UK and EU polity. One
traditional debate, which concerned the balance in a zero-sum game of  power between
two discrete states,51 has been challenged by those noting the multiplicity of  sites of
governance linked through networks,52 and complicated by the significance of  scale.53 In
a parallel, how should the tension between complex systems theory54 and post-
structuralism,55 which is a dimension of  these debates, be resolved for the purposes of
this analysis? 
2.5 CONCLUSION
Would UK exit from the EU mean that the nature of  the governance of  gendered
violence/security would be set autonomously by the UK, or shaped by other non-UK
forces: multiple plural polities; international regimes such as the UN; the imperatives of
the US hegemon; or other forces? Since autonomy is unlikely, and the EU has the softest
violence/security regime among relevant polities, Brexit is likely to have the consequence
of  hardening the UK violence/security regime and increasing violence against women.
The extent of  this change will depend on the nature of  Brexit. 
3 Brexit 
Despite the early slogan that ‘Brexit means Brexit’, there are multiple contested
approaches to Brexit. Although the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, with the
transition period intended to end on 31 December 2020, many issues concerning the
future relationship between the UK and EU were not settled in the 2020 Act.56 There
have been two sets of  agreements between the UK and EU for a Withdrawal Agreement and
Political Declaration of  the European Commission and UK government, first in 201857 and
second in 2019;58 and in March 2020 further negotiations are ongoing. The two existing
sets of  documents appear to be similar for England, Wales and Scotland, but differ
considerably for Northern Ireland, which is more closely aligned to the EU in the more
recent Agreement. In early December 2019, there appeared to be a spectrum of  options
from ‘hard Brexit’ to ‘soft Brexit’, which are discussed below. ‘Hard’ Brexit means a
rupture from the EU, with trade with the non-EU world prioritised over the EU on World
Trade Organization rules or bespoke trade rules (e.g. ‘Canada’ model). Hard Brexit may
be reached either via a failure to agree (‘no deal’) or via a negotiated departure and a
future distant relationship. ‘Soft’ Brexit means maintaining a close relationship with the
EU, maintaining EU regulatory standards and much of  the ‘acquis’ (e.g. ‘Norway’ model).
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Soft Brexit is reached via a negotiated departure and future relationship. There are further
variations and potential scenarios. 
Understanding the implications of  hard and soft Brexit requires understanding of  the
structure of  the governance of  the EU and the numerous entanglements of  the UK with
EU-level institutions. There are several types of  EU institutions: political (European
Parliament, European Commission, European Council); legal (Treaty, Directives);
juridical (European Court of  Justice); technical (e.g. Europol for law enforcement,
CEPOL or the European police college, Eurojust for judicial cooperation, Frontex for
border guards, EASO for asylum issues, FRA for fundamental rights, EIGE for gender
equality, and Eurostat for statistics). There are also strategic clusters (especially the Single
European Market and the European Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice). The Single
European Market has a complex and highly developed set of  legally binding regulatory
practices to achieve four principled freedoms of  movement for people, goods, services
and capital and a ‘level playing field’ for all actors within this economic space. These
regulations concern matters ranging from chemical safety to equalities. The coherence
and significance of  the strategic clusters has often been underestimated; but these are
crucial in understanding the dilemmas of  Brexit. 
Hard Brexit means leaving all the EU institutions – political, legal, juridical, and
technical – as well as the strategic clusters. Soft Brexit seeks to continue economic trade
with the EU as before, with no tariffs or checks at borders for freedom of  movement
except that of  people (migration). The internal coherence of  the regulatory space of  the
Single European Market makes selective exit from one of  the four freedoms very
challenging. The UK has been offered exit from the freedom of  movement of  people and
from participation in the political institutions but not exemption from the detailed
regulation of  economic space. This is not surprising if  the highly regulated and integrated
nature of  the Single European Market is appreciated in the context of  an understanding
that markets are always regulated by sets of  rules. 
The ‘negotiations’ between the UK and EU have considered many alternatives as to
which institutions the UK would leave and which it stays part of. Even before Brexit, the
UK had obtained a bespoke relationship with the EU over its engagement in EU
institutions, being involved in many but far from all of  these. For example, on the
economy, the UK is not a member of  the EU currency; on security, the UK routinely opts
out from Directives and selectively opts back in some. However, the high level of
integration of  institutions within strategic clusters makes exit from some institutions but
not others difficult. The scope for further ad hoc bespoke arrangements seems exhausted.
The UK Brexit strategy for opting in or out of  EU institutions may be the same or
different for violence/security as for the economy, but is not covered in either Withdrawal
Agreement and only briefly mentioned in the two Political Declarations. There are suggestions
that, despite the ostensible centrality of  crime/security for traditional understandings of
sovereignty, the UK is seeking greater continuity of  its engagements over
violence/security than it is for the economy, but that the Political Declaration, by its nature,
is not an agreement to this. 
A further challenge to analysing the situation is that Brexit is not a process occurring
between two stable entities, since neither the UK nor EU, nor indeed the wider
environment, is stable. Brexit has the potential to rupture the internal relations between
the nations and devolved administrations of  the UK, including that concerning Northern
Ireland, and to change their capacities to govern violent crime and security. The EU
continuously deepens its institutional architecture towards ever closer union, as part of  its
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original design,59 with implications for democracy and justice.60 It has been undergoing
an internal review, 2017–2019, of  the balance of  decision-making between member state
and EU-level, in the context of  a crisis, where one possible outcome is some form of
‘ever closer union’.61 The COVID-19 pandemic further unsettles the wider environment
in which Brexit is taking place, with both closure of  national borders and new forms of
cooperation occurring. Brexit is taking place in the wider context of  an unstable
polarisation and turn to the right of  politics in Europe and North America, potentially
altering the nature of  Brexit.
3.1 POTENTIAL POST-BREXIT FUTURES FOR GENDERED VIOLENCE/SECURITY
Four potential outcomes (scenarios) for Brexit are postulated following the discussion of
the nature of  gender, violence/security, the governance of  gendered violence/security
and Brexit. They are: no change because the UK state governs crime and security policy;
little change because the UK continues to take EU rules while ceasing to contribute to
the making of  EU rules; little change because the relevant governance actors continue;
and major change because of  the loss of  the EU anchor for gender equality and for a
softer violence/security strategy.
At the time of  writing (March 2020), Brexit has happened; but it is unlikely that the
process of  adjusting the relations between the UK and EU will be complete by the target
date for the end of  the transitional period of  31 December 2020. While the details will
soon be out of  date, the wider issues brought into focus by Brexit concerning the
significance of  the relationships between the UK, member states and the EU for the
governance of  gendered violence will continue to be relevant.
3.2 NO CHANGE BECAUSE THE UK STATE GOVERNS CRIME AND SECURITY
The premise of  the first scenario is that there would be no change because the UK state
(and devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) governs crime
and security policy. If  the competence to govern violent crime and security is solely that
of  the UK polity (and devolved administrations), then exit from the EU would make no
difference to the governance of  gendered violence and security in the UK. However, this
is not the case since the UK state (and devolved administrations) is not the sole source
of  governance over crime and security.
The EU-level has acquired significant competence over law and policy for crime and
security, especially since the 2006 Treaty of  Lisbon. This moved the subsidiarity boundary
between member states and the EU-level, concerning the lowest level of  decision-making
consistent with effective governance, in favour of  the EU-level. This is likely to change
further in this direction. The extent to which the EU has legal and practical competence
in the field of  violence and security is underestimated in the ‘no change’ scenario. Since
the EU as well as the UK governs crime and security, the premise of  this scenario is
voided.
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3.3 LITTLE CHANGE BECAUSE THE UK WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE EU RULES WHILE CEASING
TO CONTRIBUTE TO MAKING EU RULES
The premise of  the second scenario is that the EU has become a hegemon at least in its
neighbourhood, and the UK will struggle to produce and implement a different form of
governance of  gendered violence/security. There would be little change if  the UK
implements EU rules after it exits from the EU-level political entities that set the rules. If
the UK continues to participate in and accept the rulings of  the EU-level technical
agencies while removing itself  from the EU-level political decision-making entities, there
will be little change. For example, the independent body proposed to oversee legal
disputes would take guidance on its legal principles from the European Court of  Justice. 
Taking EU rules while not making EU rules depends on the nature of  the legal Brexit
process. It appears to be proposed in both Withdrawal Agreements and is consistent with the
earlier UK White Paper. It is also consistent with previous UK decisions concerning the
Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice, in a context in which the UK had acquired the
capacity to select into which EU initiatives (e.g. Directives) in this Area it would opt in.
While the UK had stated that it would not accept the jurisdiction of  the European Court
of  Justice, the Withdrawal Agreements propose an independent body that would take its legal
practice from this court. However, a hard, no deal Brexit would reject the supremacy of
the European institutions, including its court.
3.4 LITTLE CHANGE BECAUSE THE MAIN GOVERNANCE ACTORS WILL CONTINUE TO
INFLUENCE
The premise of  the third scenario is that the state institutions of  the UK and EU are not
important in the governance of  gendered violence as compared with other polities and
entities at different scales. There would be little change if  the sources of  governance in
the EU and UK operate through principles and networks of  mutual exchange that are not
dependent on centralised EU state machinery and its relationship to the UK state. There
would be little change if  the governance of  gendered violence/security is centred not in
the EU or UK, but rather in international entities, in particular the UN, but also the
Council of  Europe, the European Court of  Human Rights and NATO. If  the source of
governance is other than the EU polity, then exit from the EU will have little effect. 
However, in the governance of  crime and security, centralised state machineries that
make and clarify law and its implementation are significant. It is not possible to avoid
centralised harmonised standard-setting and interpretation of  legal rules in this domain.
While practices for implementation and exchange of  innovative and best practices involve
cooperation between actors at other levels, including local states, ultimately local entities
benchmark and anchor their legal regulations in centralised state/polity institutions.
Hence, changes in the nature and relationship of  the UK and EU polities will have
implications for the (gendered) governance of  violence and security.
Further, while the UN is important in setting international standards at an abstract
level, their implementation remains extremely varied between states. Implementation
matters. Even if  the UK were to continue to abide by international legal instruments that
also set standards for the EU, this is not a guarantee of  stable practices, since these UN
(and other international entities) are not the main source of  practices for implementation. 
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This scenario is unlikely, since the UK and EU states are important in the shaping the
governance of  gendered violence/security. 
3.5 MAJOR CHANGE BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF THE EU ANCHOR FOR (GENDER) EQUALITY
AND FOR A ‘SOFTER’ SECURITY STRATEGY
The premise of  the fourth scenario is that the EU is a significant source of  governance
of  gendered violence and that exit will remove this influence. There is likely to be a major
change because the UK governance of  gendered violence would lose its anchor to laws
and policies embedded in EU Treaties and implemented in institutions developed for its
economic and security strategies. The EU contributes to the governance of  gendered
violence/security in the UK through laws and policies rooted in the Treaty of  Lisbon and
related acquis and implemented through the European Commission, European Court of
Justice, and many technical agencies supporting its strategies for the economy through the
Single European Market and for violence/security through the European Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice. There are four components: gender equality laws and
policies; general economic policies that affect overall levels of  inequality in society; the
violence/security strategy; and global forces. In each, the EU policies are more likely to
reduce gendered violence than those policies the UK is likely to pursue and be able to
implement by itself  on exit. Probably, these components would be lost with Brexit. The
effects of  loss of  the EU anchor are likely to increase over time.
The first component concerns gender equality laws; and whether these are
domestically rooted in the UK or dependent on the EU. Currently, it is both. There is a
debate as to whether this was independently developed by the UK, developed jointly by
UK and EU actors, or imposed on the UK by the EU.62 There is the additional and
perhaps more important issue of  the trajectory of  development of  UK law on gender
equality on exit from the EU, if  and when the Treaty obligations to maintain the
Directives end. There are competing political forces: on the one hand, advocates of  free
markets have included gender equality labour market regulations and maternity leave in
their recommendations to cutting out ‘red tape’ (Institute of  Directors), and these may be
given impetus in the search for ‘free trade deals’; on the other hand, the UK government
has so far committed to maintaining the current laws and policies (White Paper). 
The second component concerns equality laws more generally; and whether the loss
of  laws and policies for equality centred on the Single European Market would have
consequences for the rate of  violence against women. On the one hand, it might appear
that they concern separate institutional domains – economy and violence/security – so
they would not. On the other hand, the increase in gendered economic inequalities that
would be consequent on their loss would be likely to increase violence against women. If
gender is conceptualised as a regime, rather than as a set of  autonomous institutions, then
links between economy and violence can be brought into focus. The loss of  gender
equality regulations would increase gendered economic inequalities and would be likely to
increase violence against women. 
The third component concerns the approach to the governance of  violence/security;
and whether the EU is different from the UK. The EU has a softer, more social-
democratic approach to the strategy for violence and security, which is more gender-
equality aligned, than the strategy that the UK pursues when it has the capacity for
independent action. This concerns both internal security, or law and order, and external
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security, such as interstate diplomacy and capacity for war. The UK has a harder, more
coercive and violent internal and external security strategy than the EU. The EU strategy
is softer, more dependent upon diplomacy than violence. The EU has been developing its
competence in internal and external security matters. In external affairs this includes the
capacity for diplomacy. While NATO has been the primary form of  military cooperation,
where the US has been hegemonic, the EU is developing capability in external affairs and
security. The UK is preparing to exit from a large bloc that has a softer security strategy
than its own or NATO. An example concerns whether the UK is more or less likely to go
to war after Brexit than before and its implications for gendered violence since conflict
zones have higher rates of  violence against women than non-conflict zones. The loss of
the EU anchor is likely to increase gender-based violence. 
The fourth component concerns vulnerability to other forces. These forces include
other polities, such as the US hegemon, China and any state with which the UK seeks a
trade deal, and global capital, especially global finance capital. These forces generate
higher levels of  inequality and violence. The EU has greater capacity to withstand the
pressures of  these forces than the UK because of  its scale and capabilities. The loss of
the EU anchor is likely to increase inequality and violence in the UK. 
The loss of  the EU is likely to change the nature of  the gender regime in the UK so
that it takes a more neoliberal form of  the public gender regime, which is associated with
higher rates of  violence against women. 
Conclusions
The analysis of  the governance of  gendered violence addressed four issues: gendered
institutions and gender regimes; the governance of  violence; the relationship of  states
and other entities in the governance of  gendered violence; and the nature of  the EU.
They are relevant to the evaluation of  the potential of  different feminist strategies to end
violence against women.
To understand the causes of  changes in gendered violence it is necessary to know the
connections between the different aspects of  gender relations, the extent to which
changes in one institutional domain would change another; and to conceptualise the
changes. There are sufficient links between clusters of  gendered institutions (economy,
polity, civil society, violence) to constitute gender regimes; and that understanding
developments in any one gendered institution required taking into account its
environment that is made up of  other gendered institutions. Varieties of  regimes can be
distinguished not only between domestic and public, but also between forms of  the
public gender regime, which can be divided into more social democratic and more
neoliberal forms. The implications are that changes in the form of  the gendered economy
from a more social democratic to more neoliberal form can have consequences for other
gendered institutions and for the regime as a whole. Hence, the consequences of  Brexit
for gendered violence/security are affected by the consequences of  Brexit for gendered
economies. Brexit is likely to lead to a change in the form of  the UK gender regime,
which has consequences for gendered violence/security. 
There is one interconnected institutional domain of  violence, which underpins the
field of  security. While there are multiple institutions, each with its specificity, they are
sufficiently linked together to constitute a single domain so that an increase in violence in
one institution is likely to entail an increase in violence in the others. Strategies for
violence/security differ. One is to increase state capacity to utilise harsher, more coercive,
more violent opposition to the violence of  others with the goal of  reducing their violence
through deterrence and reducing their capacity. A second is to utilise state capacity to
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reduce inequalities including between potential victims and perpetrators of  violence,
including targeted support to potential victims for prevention and mitigation of  harm.
The UK is closer to the first, harder strategy, and the EU to the second, softer strategy.
The governance of  violence requires analysis along two dimensions: strategies and the
institutional capacity of  relevant polities. The most relevant polities for the UK currently
are the UK and the EU. Transnational entities such as the UN and Council of  Europe
have legal instruments focused on human rights that are significant for standard-setting,
but much less significant for implementation. The notion of  autonomous state action is
not supported. If  the UK were to leave the EU, then the harder security strategy of  the
US becomes more significant. 
The different forms of  Brexit entail the UK leaving different EU-level institutions,
varying from all institutions to only the political institutions. However, it is difficult to
leave some but not all EU institutions because of  the high level of  integration of  EU
institutions within its strategies for economic growth in the Single European Market and
for violence/security in the European Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice.
Four potential scenarios for Brexit were assessed: no change because only the UK
state governs violence/security; little change because polities and entities other than the
EU shape violence security in the UK; little change because the UK will continue to take
EU rules in relation to violence/security while leaving EU political institutions; and major
change as a consequence of  the loss of  the EU anchor for gender and equality and for
the governance of  violence/security. The three scenarios that lead to little or no change
were found unlikely. The fourth scenario, major change, is the most likely. The probable
changes would be linked to the significantly greater capacities and strategies for (gender)
equality in the EU than UK and the significantly softer more social democratic security
strategy of  the EU than UK, both of  which are likely to be lost to the UK as Brexit
occurs. These changes would be consistent with expectations of  an increase in violence
against women. This is a consequence of  three associations: reduced strength of  (gender)
equality laws and policies, rooted in the Single European Market, leading to an increase in
gendered violence; reduced pressure to deploy a soft rather than coercive security
strategy, which is likely to lead to increased violence, some of  which will be against
women; and the general shift away from social-democratic to neoliberal social formation,
which generates more inequality and more violence. Brexit is likely to diminish the quality
of  the governance of  gendered violence/security over the medium and long-term. It is
likely to diminish laws and policies that promote gender equality, equality in the economy
more generally, and to harden the violence/security strategy. The consequence of  these
changes is likely to lead to an increase in gendered violence. The changes are
interconnected, since changes in one institutional domain in the gender regime change
other institutional domains. The overall change in the gender regime in the UK is towards
a more neoliberal form of  the public gender regime. The analysis of  Brexit provides a
lens through which to consider the implications of  changes in multiple polities for the
governance of  violence. No single state or polity is sufficient; multiple polities and their
changing intersection need to be brought into focus. 
The implications of  this analysis for feminist strategy to end violence against women
is that Brexit is very important, rather than marginal; it is potentially a tipping point in the
violence system. This is because of  the interconnections between gender violence and the
form of  the gender regime and because of  the significance of  the EU in the shaping of
the form of  the gender regime.
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